Lessons from American Bank Supervision from the Nineteenth Century to the Great Depression

> Eugene N. White Rutgers University and NBER

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago-IMF 13th Annual International Banking Conference September 23-24, 2010

A Look Back to 1864-1933

- <u>Is Micro-Prudential Regulation Sufficient?</u>: Can the financial system's safety be ensured by ensuring individual financial Institutions are safe
- If there are externalities/spillovers, what kind of <u>Macro-Prudential Regulation</u> is needed to manage the overall system's risk?
- Look back at history
- (1) A time when Micro-Prudential Regulation was sufficient—what was different?
- (2) How this regime was overturned to vastly greater regulation & supervision

Five Policy Regimes of Bank Supervision in the U.S.

- 1. National Banking Era 1864-1913
- 2. Early Federal Reserve Period, 1914-1932
- 3. <u>New Deal, 1933-1970</u>
- 4. Demise of the New Deal, 1971-1990
- 5. The Contemporary Era, 1991-2008

What Are Today's Key Issues

- Do Price Stability and Financial Stability Conflict? Countercyclical Policy for Price Stability→Financial Instability? LOLR in Financial Crises→Price Instability?
- 2. Supervision: Independent of the Central Bank? Does LOLR require Supervision Powers?
- 3. Industry-Specific Agencies or a Central Agency? How to Prevent Regulatory Capture/Rogue Agencies
- 4. Agency Transparency and Political Oversight
- Philosophy of Bank Supervision?
 Reinforce market discipline? or Independent of the market? If so, then Rules or Discretion-Based

National Banking Era, 1864-1913

- 1. No Central Bank—No Conflict Money supply determined by gold standard
- 2. Independent Supervision
- 3. Industry-Specific Agencies or Central Agency? One federal bank agency---the OCC State bank agencies regulate state-chartered banks
- Independence/Transparency/Oversight: Comptroller has long-terms of office Regularly Reports Occasional Congressional Hearings
- 5. Philosophy:

Supervision Reinforces Market Discipline

Regulation and Bank Structure National Banking Era, 1864-1913

- Capital
 - Minimum Capital Requirements for entry
 - No Capital Ratios
 - BUT Double Liability
 - No Deposit Insurance
- Easy Entry + Prohibition on Branching = Thousands of Single Office Banks
- In 1900 8,136 national and state banks
 Range from tiny to large city banks
- No Central Bank & High Reserve Requirements:
 - Reserves held at city correspondent banks = "Pyramiding of Deposits" in NYC, Chicago
 - Increases Potential for incipient Panic to become nationwide

Examination & Supervision: OCC

- Disclosure: 3 Yearly Surprise Call Reports
- Examination: 2 Yearly Surprise Exams
- Enforcement:
 - Only Tool: Revocation of Charter
 - Mark-to-Market & Prompt Closure
- Number of Examiners & National Banks
 - 1889: 30 examiners/ 3,239 banks
 - 1907: 100 examiners/6,422 banks

"It is scarcely to be expected, if a robber or a forger is placed in control of all its assets, that a national bank can be saved from disaster by the occasional visits of an examiner."

Comptroller Knox, Annual Report (1881).

Developments: 1864-1913

- Growth of Banking Outside of Federal "Safety Net"
 - Growth of State-Chartered Banks
 - Become dominant in rural areas
 - Weaker regulations---increasingly small & undiversified
 - Growth of Trust Companies
 - Challenge national banks in cities
 - Weaker regulations, more leveraged
 - Panic of 1907 starts in NYC Trust Companies

	National Banks	State Banks	Trust Companies
1890	3,484	2,534	255
1905	5,664	7,920	1,115

Frequent Financial Crises 1864-1913

- Major Banking Panics: 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, 1907 and many minor panics.
 - Public panics→currency/deposit ratios soar
 - Bankers panic
 - country banks withdraw from city banks, quickly makes a panic nationwide
- No Central Bank to act as LOLR.
- Some Panics end in Suspension of Payments
- Recessions with Panics are more severe and longer in duration
- <u>BUT these panics are primarily Liquidity Events</u> <u>NOT Solvency Events---even if a bank failure</u> started a panic, no large system-wide losses from bank insolvencies.

Costs of Bank Failures

- 1864-1913: 501 National Bank insolvencies
 - Average Payout 76%
 - 89% collected from assets
 - 11% in assessments on shareholders (paying 48 cents on every dollar assessed)
 - Total Loss \$20 million
 - 1870 Total National Bank Deposits: \$705 million
 - 1913 Total National Bank Deposits: \$8.1 billion
- Why so small?
- <u>1864-1913: 2,373 National Bank voluntary</u> <u>liquidations-</u>--directors close banks---no losses to customers
- State Banks same magnitude of losses

Assessment of 1864-1914

- "Microprudential" Rules Work Well to Limit Insolvencies---Capital/Asset Ratio>20%
 - Double Liability/No Deposit Insurance/Supervision Reinforces Market Discipline
- But there are Panics and they occur because:
- Key Problem 1: Fragmented Banking System small, undiversified banks with reserves at correspondents
- Key Problem 2: Absence of a Central Bank to act as LOLR

Federal Reserve Act of 1913

- Problem 2 "solved": Fed to prevent panics by providing liquidity through the discount window and reduce seasonality of interest rates.
- Problem 1 remains—no change in branching prohibition, system with thousands of small, undiversified unit banks.
- Fed Reserve Era begins to change bank supervision

Early Years of the Fed: 1914-1932 Key Issues

1. Monetary/Financial Policy Conflict?

Postwar Deflation→Surge in Bank Failures.

2. Supervision independent of central bank?

Supervision is contested

Fed takes "call" reports from OCC

OCC blocks Fed access to examination reports for discounting/LOLR

3. More than one agency?

Struggle erupts between Fed and OCC, as Fed attempts to attract state member banks

4. Political Independence /Transparency /Oversight:

OCC unchanged.

FR Banks not government agencies—different oversight


5. Philosophy of Supervision?

Weakening of Supervision to Reinforce Market Discipline

Conflict emerges between Monetary Stability and Financial Stability


- High Inflation World War I
- Fed raises rates in 1920→Deflation & Recession
- Number of bank failures rise
 - Most severe for small state banks with longer term agricultural loans
 - Failures 1921-1929: 766 out of 8,000 NB banks fail.
 - Payout is lower than in 1865-1913: 40¢ per \$.
 - Total loss for all banks \$565 million (\$6.9 billion in 2009\$) or 0.6% of 1925 GDP
 - Modest for size of shock.

Percentage of Banks Failing and Inflation 1866-1929



Monetary Policy→More Risk-Taking and Less Incentive to Voluntarily Liquidate—Relative Decline

- "Greenspan Put": Fed promises to end panics by smoothing interest rate fluctuations→risk-taking
- 2. Discount window: Some banks rapidly become dependent on discount window—voluntary liquidations decline
 - In 1925,
 - 593 banks borrowing for more than one year
 - 239 borrowing continuously since 1920
 - Fed est. 259 of failed banks since 1920 were "habitual borrowers."



Changes in Bank Supervision arising from Regulatory Competion

- Disclosure: 1918→1926 Fed Reduces "Call" Reports Reduces 5→2 (April 12 & June 30).
- Examination: OCC charges for examination—FR Banks absorb the cost.
- Number of OCC Examiners rise—cope with failures
- Capital to Asset Ratio Declines.

	No. of Examiners	No. of Banks	Banks per examiner
1915: OCC	103	7,597	74
1925: OCC	221	8,054	36
1925: Fed	21	1,472	70

The "Great Regime Shift" to the New Deal

Great Depression 1929-1933

- Unexpected Deflationary Shock, Prices drop 23%
- Real GDP falls 39%

Banking Shrinks

- July 1929: 24,504 commercial banks, \$49 billion deposits
- Bank Holiday March 1933 ("Stress Test") 11,878 banks with \$23 billion.

Losses from failed banks

- Totaled \$2.5 billion (\$39 billion in 2009)
- Half to depositors and to half shareholders
- 2.4% of GDP.

The "Great Regime Shift" to the New Deal: A Misdiagnosis

- Regulation: Competitive Market → Government-Regulated Cartel.
- (Erroneously Assume Competition Failed---not Deflationary Shock)
- Supervision: Reinforcing Market Discipline→ Discretion-Based Supervision & Forbearance
- (Erroneously Assume Markets Can't Value Assets because of Volatile Price Expectations)
- Deposit Insurance ends Double Liability



The New Deal: 1933-1970 and beyond

1. Monetary/Financial Policy Conflict?

Supervision Subordinated to Monetary Policy

2. Supervision independent of central bank?

Split Supervision though increased Cooperation

3. More than one agency?

More agencies---one for each segment of industry: OCC, FR, FDIC, SEC, FRHBB....+ States Opportunities for Regulatory Arbitrage "Competition in Laxity" & Regulatory Capture

4. Political Independence /Transparency /Oversight:

More agencies → independent but less transparency and less oversight

5. Philosophy of Supervision?

End of Market Discipline & Market Valuation→Discretion-Based Supervision

The New Deal, 1933-1970

	1
1. Entry	Regulatory Discretion
2. Capital Requirements	Regulators Examine Capital Adequacy—No RulesDiscretion
3. Limits on Economies of Scale	Branching & Mergers Limited
4. Limits on Economies of Scope & Diversification	Banks Narrowly Re-Defined; Glass-Steagall Act
5. Limits on Pricing	Regulation Q
6. Liability Insurance	Deposit Insurance Ends Double Liability
7. Disclosure	Fewer Call Reports
8. Examination	Intrinsic Soundness Not Market Value
9. Supervision & Enforcement	Regulatory Forbearance

New Deal, 1933-1970: Golden Age?

- Why so few bank failures?
- Macroeconomic Stability, 1945-1970
- Number of bank failures: tiny
 - Weak banks eliminated in 1930s
 - WWII→Conservative asset mix
- Anti-Competitive Regulation
 - Huge Costs to Households & Business
- Deposit Insurance Coverage Rises
- Capital to Asset Ratio Falls →Moral Hazard
- Set-Up for Banking Crises of 1980s and 2000s



Bottom Line: Why did pre-New Deal Supervisory Regime work?: Set correct incentives—even though flawed regulations