

Credit Market Turmoil of 2007–08: Implications for Public Policy

How Serious is the Damage?

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Preview

- Not all bubbles are created equal
- Factors underpinning bubble and its resolution influence extent of
 - financial crisis
 - amplification of business cycle

Australian Experience

Four episodes – cycles in credit/property

1890s

1930s

1970s


1990s

D'Arcy and Kent (2000), 'Cyclical Prudence – Credit Cycles in Australia'

Fisher and Kent (2000), 'Two Depressions, One Banking Collapse'


Kent and Lowe (1998), 'Property-Price Cycles and Monetary Policy'

Cycles in Australian Output, Construction, Property Prices and Credit









Cycles in Australian Output, Construction, Property Prices and Credit



Capital Ratios



Note: Shading indicates peaks in real GDP.

Factors underpinning costly Australian crises

- i. *credit* growth above trend PLUS
 - ii. rapid inflation *collateral* prices
 - iii. excessive *concentration* of investment/lending
 - iv. lack of *capital* accumulation
 - v. *competitive* pressures – liberalisation/innovation
- i. and ii. – Borio and Lowe (2002) – speed kills
 - during contractions – policy matters

Patrick Honohan – Bank Failures

What he says...

- Overconfidence in risk management models
- Detailed account of a number of ‘failing’ financial institutions
- Estimates direct costs of write-downs and fiscal support
- Policy?
 - Short-term response to failing institutions – slow, equity losers, managers?
 - Long-term – need less rules based, more discretionary approaches to risk management

Patrick Honohan – Bank Failures

What I thought...

- The problem with models
 - ‘Normal’ times vs tail events?
 - Perceived risk – recent realisations – difference from actual risk?
 - Perceptions better than actual in upturns, worse in downturns
 - Models too similar? One-sided markets
- Case studies, common theme?
 - Rapid growth, capacity to manage/control? Driven by concerns re revenues & market-shares – e.g. UBS
- ‘Successful’ institutions’ strategies?
 - Senior Supervisors Group (2008)
- Why is capital so expensive?
 - Overoptimism of creditors – exit, rescue, perceived risks

David Greenlaw – Real Economy Costs

What he does...

- Estimates of losses by leveraged financial institutions
- Assesses implications for domestic lending
 - balance between capital losses and asset reduction
- Examines effect on economic activity
 - single equation estimate GDP growth link to DNFD
 - loan officer survey and TED spreads – used as instruments to identify true supply-side effect

David Greenlaw – Real Economy Costs

What I thought...

- Simplicity of approach is valuable
- But, single equation as it is may miss some important effects
- Financial accelerator – may make things worse
 - recursive feedback from real activity to financial sector: role for collateral prices, longer horizons, asymmetric effects?
- Strong policy response – may make things better
- Need a system of equations

S “Vish” Viswanathan –Financial Market Damage

What he says...

- Review of network market inefficiencies
- Contrast with ‘consolidated’ markets which have:
 - liquidity under stress, timely & ‘accurate’ price discovery, standardised products, central clearing house, disclosure rules, resolution of defaults
- Provides description of network market failures
 - amplification of shocks – role of collateral, margins, mark-to-market accounting
- Policy? Regulatory changes needed for
 - More: standardisation, market makers, transparency, role for clearing houses, among other things...

S “Vish” Viswanathan –Financial Market Damage

What I thought...

- Discussion for existence and benefits of network markets
 - why don't they move to consolidated markets?
 - tailored products likely to remain? But which?
- How to encourage transformation?
 - need to focus on removing impediments to standardisation/simplification, use of clearing houses
- Scope for markets to do much on their own?

Conclusion