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Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications
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Last Updated: 11/10/2003

Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications

Nicola Cetorelli, Philip E. Strahan

This paper tests how competition in local U.S. banking markets affects the market structure of non-financial sectors. Theory offers competing hypotheses about how competition ought to influence firm entry and access to bank credit by mature firms. The empirical evidence, however, strongly supports the idea that in markets with concentrated banking, potential entrants face greater difficulty gaining access to credit than in markets where banking is more competitive.

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