

# Source of Chicago's Economic Dynamism

- Rich and efficient transport background has kept Chicago on world's economic map for over 150 years.
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> largest intermodal transportation center in the world

#### Water

- Erie canal → East Coast, Illinois & Michigan canal → Mississippi
- Metro Chicago has two ports capable of handling ocean-going ships and barges

#### Rail

- 10 major railroad lines by 1850's; 1,000 trains daily by the time of the World's Columbian Exposition (1893)
- Remains nation's busiest railway hub with half of U.S. freight passing thru yards

#### Air

• O'Hare & Midway handle more passenger traffic than any other city in world

#### Roads

- Interstate highway in 1950s
- Tollway added on in late 1950s

## Payments—Past and Present

## • Toll payments made either as


- manual change: stop, hand money to an attendant, get change
- exact change: stop, throw change into bin, drive away

## • Then starting in 1993


- New electronic payment option—a radio frequency identification device (RFID)—brand-named I-PASS
- I-PASS: the correct toll amount is deducted electronically upon passing through specially equipped toll gates
- The I-PASS is currently integrated with similar electronic payment schemes in 11 Eastern states (E-Z Pass). Indiana allowed I-PASS recently, but without discounts

# The state of the I-PASS prior to 2003

• Electronic toll payments as share of all toll transactions



• Number of I-PASS transponders owned by private individuals (mln.)



• After 10 years in existence, I-PASS use and ownership were still far from universal

### I-PASS Benefits as seen from the outside

- Supply Side (the Tollway Authority):
  - Lower costs of handling cash and fraud
  - Reduce congestion:
    - open-road tolling
    - widen lanes around toll plazas
  - More options for the future
    - make congestion pricing feasible
    - raise Tollway value for possible sale/lease
- Demand Side (Tollway drivers):
  - Alleviate cash-carry burden
  - Faster, more predictable commutes

# Chicken and egg problem facing Tollway

- Couldn't add I-PASS lanes (supply side) unless had enough I-PASS users
  - Non-trivial costs: \$50 million per toll plaza (about 100 plazas)
- Might not be able to get enough motorists to switch to I-PASS (demand side) unless they had "exclusive" lanes to reap potential congestion relief benefits
  - I-PASS acquisition highly inconvenient prior to Nov '03

# Tollway Authority acted!

stage 1

- Marketing campaign
  - Jewel/Osco a big local grocery chain (200+ stores)
    - Exclusive I-PASS distributor starting November 2003
    - Jewel did not charge for this service
  - Local NBC affiliate (quid pro quo)
    - exclusive access to toll cameras in exchange for on-air I-PASS promotion starting in October 2004

stage 2

- Promote I-PASS usage by penalizing cash payments
  - Cash tolls doubled on January 1, 2005
  - But I-PASS tolls remained unchanged!

# So what is this study about?

• Did Tollway actions accomplish their stated goal?

- Which groups of consumers did they affect? Who chose the I-PASS?
  - when it was difficult to obtain, offered no cost savings, and fairly little by way of time savings
  - when it became easier to learn about and obtain (Jewel)
  - when it generated toll savings, was easier to learn about (network effects + ad campaign), and promised greater congestion relief (open-road tolling + network effects)


# Empirical questions (continued)

- Did different groups of consumers react to different channels?
  - costs of learning and acquisition (participation costs) v.
     monetary costs

- Holdouts: a case of high (perceived) participation costs?
  - Preferences for things other than leisure and consumption?
- Can this experience be generalized to other settings?

### Measures of Success

Number of registered I-PASS transponders for passenger vehicles





### Measures of Success

Share of I-PASS transactions (annual average)




## I-PASS shift was uniformly spread throughout the day





Notes: 1) Excludes Plaza 3 due to measurement issues; 2) Data reflects only passenger vehicles without trailers (class 1)

## I-PASS ownership before and after price change



I-PASS ownership increased uniformly not only throughout the time of day but also geographically

# A simple model of consumer choice

- The Tollway chooses lane configuration and sets tolls
- Drivers take this as given, choose payment method
- Drivers care about consumption and leisure, compare costs and benefits:

#### Costs:

- Fixed time costs learn, acquire, install
- Fixed dollar costs deposit, carry cost
- Extra variable toll costs (could be 0 or <0)

#### Benefits:

- Faster commutes
- More predictable commutes


Lower tolls

# Mapping model predictions to data

- I-PASS is more likely for households with
  - more time spent in commute
    - likelihood of tollway travel, distance, time (CTPP), congestion (GCM)
  - lower participation costs
    - education, English fluency, proximity to Jewel stores, information spillovers from neighbors and colleagues (Census, CTPP, Mapquest)
  - higher wages and/or higher wealth
- I-PASS distribution through Jewel stores
  - Lowers fixed entry costs, should matter most to occasional drivers
- Change in relative toll prices
  - Improves tradeoff at the margin, should matter most to drivers with high marginal value of consumption

# Other preferences

#### Survey responses to: Why do you not have I-PASS?



Note: The rest of the responses (13%) were not easily classified.

Source: Illinois Tollway Authority

### Role of Income

- Most variables related to I-PASS ownership bear some relationship to income
  - location relative to tollway (value of time)
  - commuting distance and duration to work
  - level of education to learn about I-PASS
  - neighborhood influences
- Thus, organizing our results by income captures a number of these relationships


### Commuting characteristics for different income groups

Table 2. Income group summaries

Income group	Number of workers (mln)	Share driving to work	Share likely driving to work on a tollway	Median commute if likely toll driver (miles)	Median annual toll costs if likely toll driver	Median distance to nearest toll exit (miles)	Mean distance to I-PASS sales outlet
Low Middle High	1.30	0.74	0.11	36.0	\$286	13.4	7.1
	2.11	0.85	0.16	34.1	\$314	11.0	6.4
	1.70	0.82	0.23	29.2	\$267	6.6	2.4

- a much higher fraction of workers in high-income could use the tollway
- their commutes are shorter, but toll costs are about the same
  - tollway travel constitutes a higher fraction of the overall trip
- they live closer to I-PASS retail outlets and are more likely to use the tollway for things other than work-related commute

# Ownership response by income group



## I-PASS ownership for different income groups

Table 4. I-PASS ownership ratios by income group

(percentage points)

	Relative to adult population			Relative t	to likely toll co	mmuters
Income group	Nov'03	Aug'04	Feb <b>'</b> 05	Nov'03	Aug'04	Feb'05
Low	1.9	2.7	5.2	34.2	48.2	95.0
Middle	8.4	10.6	18.3	82.5	104.3	179.1
High	22.4	26.6	40.0	140.1	166.2	249.6

- At all points in time, higher incomes were associated with higher I-PASS rates
- Even before I-PASS was easy to obtain or offered any cost savings, the number of transponders among residents of high-income zip codes exceeded the number of workers in those zip code who could take the tollway to work
- Residents of low-income zip codes are only now beginning to approach "saturation" levels for likely tollway drivers

# Regressions

- I-PASS demand for all drivers is a function of
  - Likelihood of tollway use, whether work or leisure (proximity to tollway)
  - Learning costs
  - Income and wealth (income distribution)
- For tollway commuters, I-PASS demand is also a function of
  - commute time, toll costs, congestion along the route
     (percentage difference between AM and midday travel times)
  - these matter for all drivers, but are observable only for tollway commuters

## Change in I-PASS adoption from changes in key variables

<u> </u>		Regime	
Change in "new" I-PASS adoption rate (in ppt)		Jewel but same to	oll
from change in:	Pre-Jewel	price	Different toll prices
	The Jewer	priec	Different ton prices
Distance to the nearest Tollway exit (miles)	-0.41	-1.11	-1.04
Fraction of likely tollway commuters (ppt)	0.14	0.31	0.58
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Distance to the Tollway HQ (home or work)	-0.10	-0.02	-0.01
Distance to the nearest Jewel store (miles)	0.00	-0.30	-0.20
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Recent immigrants (ppt)	-0.07	0.00	0.03
I-PASS in neighboring ZIPs (ppt)	0.15	0.31	0.17
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Average travel time (10 min)	0.28	0.06	-1.56
Average toll costs (dollars)	-0.59	-1.21	3.36
Avg. tollway congestion (ppt difference)	NA	-0.03	-0.17
reference: "new" I-PASS adopton rate (ppt) during	7.5	3.5	6.4

- Income distribution and college education matter in all periods (not shown)
- Since Nov 03, distance to Jewel and not the Tollway HQ is an influential factor
- Costs of commute begin to matter only after the hike in cash tolls
- Time in commute was relevant only for the earliest adopters, becomes negative in the last regime, indicating that those commuters had already gotten the I-PASS
- Congestion measure is counterintuitive: bad proxy or "bad" time period?

## Did all income groups react similarly to toll hike?

• Interact key coefficients with income group, repeat the regression for transponders acquired after the toll hike

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Variable name	Low-income	Medium-income	High-income
Distance to the nearest Jewel store (in miles)	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.03***
Average toll costs * Share of LTC	7.78***	0.79	1.10
Average travel time * Share of LTC	-0.26***	-0.06***	-0.08***
Avg. tollway congestion * Share of LTC	3.95	-2.54	-9.42***

Regression coefficients for ...

271

138

• Drivers in low-income zip codes were the ones responding to price increase

152

Others were still motivated by ease of acquisition

N (zip codes)

• All drivers with longest commutes seem to have acquired I-PASS well before

# I-PASS drivers: changes over time

Share of toll drivers paying less than 6 tolls/week

	Before Jewel	After Toll Change
High income	58%	70%
Medium income	52%	60%
Low income	55%	55%

- The distribution of toll expenses in high-income shifted to the left evidence of more leisure drivers acquiring I-PASS transponders
- In contrast, low-income drivers distribution changed relatively little and there remain substantially more "workers" among low-income I-PASS owners

### Conclusions

- I-PASS pricing experiment appears to be highly successful
- Tollway increased I-PASS participation among all income groups with a high proportion of all commuters in each group that should take the tollway paying electronically
- Both the reduction in costs of learning and acquisition and the change in relative toll prices had a measurable effect on adoption of electronic payments


# Conclusion (cont.)

- The doubling of cash tolls appears to have had an effect on pushing low-income drivers to electronic payments: couldn't afford to continue paying in cash
- Among the two more affluent income groups, I-PASS ownership exceeds commuting needs by considerable margins reflecting the convenience benefits of electronic payment
- Network dynamics learning from neighbors and coworkers – appear to play an important role in fostering I-PASS adoption

### Our Data

- Illinois Tollway
  - Payment choices by lane, hourly from Jan 1 2004 to June 30 2005
  - I-PASS ownership data, at zip code level (August 2004 & February 2005)
  - I-PASS transactions data, at individual transponder level, for select weeks between February 2004 and May 2006
    - used to estimate I-PASS ownership in different model regimes
- 2000 Census
  - Demographic and economic information at zip code level
- Census Transportation and Planning Package (CTPP)
  - where people live and work (by census tract), transportation mode, and commute time
    - used to estimate the likelihood of tollway commuting
- Other (Maptitude, Mapquest)
  - Location of retail outlets (Jewel stores), tollway exit and entry points

# I-PASS drivers: changes over time



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