


Identity Fraud – Valuing Compromised Data

2008 Chicago Federal Reserve Payments Conference

Jeff Schmidt, MBA, CISSP jschmidt@jschmidt.org


The Economics of Security



- (Most) Effective security measures are rooted in economics
- "Never spend more money solving a problem than tolerating it will cost you" (Courtney's Second Law)



Two Very Different Actors



Rational criminal behavior

- Strictly financial motivations
- Deterred when economic costs exceed their benefit
- Notion of "Acceptable Losses"

Irrational actors

- Non-financial motivation
- Terrorists, pedophiles, political activists, etc.
- "Acceptable Losses" may be effectively zero
- Only deterred when economic costs exceed their means, not their benefit
- Tradeoffs between enemy's (anticipated) capabilities and deployment of our own

What is the Value?



Breach	Number of CC Account Numbers	Value @ \$3 per ⁽¹⁾	Value @ \$100 per ⁽²⁾	Cost @ \$182 per ⁽³⁾	
CardSystems (mid 2005) 2006 Rev (est): \$20M Assets acquired for \$47M	40 Million	\$120 Million	\$4 Billion	\$7.28 Billion	
TJX (July 2005) ⁽⁴⁾ Cap: \$12.35B 2006 Rev: \$17.4B	95 Million (and growing)	\$285 Million 23% 1.6%	\$9.5 Billion 77% 55%	\$17.2 Billion 139% 99%	

- (1) Symantec, March 2007
- (2) World Bank / APWG, January 2005
- (3) Ponemon, October 2006
- (4) 450,00 "Full Identities" also compromised

March 2007: The Market Rates



Item	Advertised Price (in US Dollars)
United States-based credit card with card verification value	\$1-\$6
United Kingdom-based credit card with card verification value	\$2-\$12
An identity (including US bank account, credit card, date of birth, and government issued identification number)	\$14-\$18
List of 29,000 emails	\$5
Online banking account with a \$9,900 balance	\$300
Yahoo Mail cookie exploit—advertised to facilitate full access when successful	\$3
Valid Yahoo and Hotmail email cookies	\$3
Compromised computer	\$6-\$20
Phishing Web site hosting—per site	\$3-5
Verified PayPal account with balance (balance varies)	\$50-\$500
Univerified PayPal account with balance (balance varies)	\$10-\$50
Sky pe account	\$12
World of Warcraft account—one month duration	\$10

Table 3. Advertised prices of items traded on underground economy servers

Source: Symantec Corporation


- 33x Risk Premium on cash bank accounts
- High Risk Premiums in general (especially 'complete identity')
- C V V secret is "part of the deal"
- Seems to indicate commodization, maturing market

Impact to TJX



Dec 29, 2006 Nov 2, 2007

Close: \$28.52



TJX vs S&P Retail Index 1/1/07 - present





Impact?



CardSystems

- Killed by Visa & AMEX using PCI (Oct 31, 2005)
- Assets sold to PayByTouch
- "We do not feel like we paid anything like a fire sale price" – CyberSource after signing LOI
- Assets sold at ~2x multiple; liabilities discharged
- PayByTouch settled with FTC (Feb 2006)

TJX

- Net change in share price: \$-0.75
- Shares outstanding: 444.62M
- Lost value: \$333.47M
- 52 Week pps change: -2.49%
- Slightly underperformed S&P Retail Index for 6 mos

TJX Now



- June 3, 2003 close: \$32.23
- 52 week high is 34.93
- Poster-child for PCI

Jim Cramer 4/708:

"I like TJX. They're executing... they're doing a great job. It's one of my favorite retailers ...No way am I backing away!"

Thoughts



- There is too much data to protect; we must make the data less valuable
 - Identity information seems to be losing value
 - Likely due to success in "back-end" fraud detection / prevention
- Are economic (dis) incentives aligned with security responsibility? In the event of a breech, do the responsible parties feel the pain?
- Do the data stewards care about breeches?

For More Information



- Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS) <u>www.econinfosec.org</u>
- The economic cost of publicly announced information security breaches: empirical evidence from the stock market
 Journal of Computer Security
 Volume 11, Issue 3 (March 2003)
- Economics of Information Security
 L. Jean Camp and Stephen Lewis, Editors
 2004, ISBN: 1402080891

Jeff Schmidt jschmidt@jschmidt.org