

Asset Pricing when “This Time Is Different”

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Motivation

Part I:

- ▶ Learning can have sizable AP implications with EZ preferences
 - ▶ “long-run-risk” logic at individual-investor level
 - ▶ persistent, variable updates to beliefs
 - ▶ preference for early resolution of uncertainty
- ▶ Evidence that learning is “imperfect”
 - ▶ Malmendier and Nagel (2011): over-weight personal experiences
⇒ large updates to beliefs

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Part II:

- ▶ Agents of different ages coexist
 - ▶ Do their beliefs average out?
 - ▶ Does risk-sharing reinforce the risk faced by agents?

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Part III:

- ▶ What if there is investment?

“This Time is Different”: Malmendier and Nagel

- ▶ Not Bayesian updating
- ▶ Quite strong emphasis on recent observations (returns, inflation)
- ▶ No weight on history before agent's birth
- ▶ Malmendier and Nagel (2011) – weight on shock l quarters ago for age a :

$$w_{a,l} = \frac{l^\lambda}{\sum_{l'=0}^{a-1} l'^\lambda}, \quad \lambda \approx 1.5$$

- ▶ Malmendier and Nagel (2013) – weight on latest shock:

$$\gamma_a = \frac{\theta}{a}, \quad \theta \approx 3.$$

- ▶ Bayesian updating would require $\lambda = 0$ ($\theta = 1$)

“This Time is Different”: CJL

- ▶ Model:

$$m_{t+1} = (1 + A_t)^{-1}m_t + A_t(1 + A_t)^{-1}\Delta c_t$$

$$A_{t+1} = A_t(1 + A_t)^{-1}, \quad A_0 = kA_{2T}$$

- ▶ Bayesian updating \Rightarrow equal weighting of all experienced data points
- ▶ History before agent's birth is downweighted
- ▶ Every new cohort takes the posterior mean of previous generation as its prior mean, but with higher variance ($k = 5$ times higher)
 - ▶ Captures the notion of overweighting recent experiences
 - ▶ But less than Malmendier-Nagel
- ▶ Relevant observations for asset pricing:
 - ▶ CJL innovations permanent, MN not
 - ▶ CJL weight on latest shock drops faster with age (both start at 3%, end at 0.5% vs 1%)
 - ▶ CJL heterogeneity in updating across agents higher

Preferences, Demographics, Dividends

- ▶ Two cohorts alive at any point in time
 - ▶ Each lives $2T$ periods
 - ▶ Age difference always T
- ▶ EZ preferences with perfect bequest \Rightarrow two (representative) agents that, every $2T$ quarters, experience a dramatic loss of confidence in their understanding of the world
 - ▶ Stochastic discount factor

$$SDF_{t+1} \propto C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \left(\frac{W_{t+1}}{C_{t+1}} \right)^{-\frac{\gamma - \frac{1}{\psi}}{1 - \frac{1}{\psi}}}$$

- ▶ Usual (Bansal-Yaron) parameters
- ▶ “Leverage”: $\beta_{\Delta d, \Delta c} = 3$





Results

- ▶ Basically, it “works” (both versions) wrt AP moments
- ▶ Insights into the effect of heterogeneity in a TTID world
 - ▶ Different beliefs \Rightarrow excess volatility
 - ▶ Young and old update towards the same target, young more aggressively \Rightarrow Young perceive higher risk (LRR)
 - ▶ Excess volatility through risk-sharing can be overturned in some states: more optimistic agent may face more risk, therefore still seek insurance
 - ▶ Average effect is to increase excess volatility: analogous to heterogeneous risk aversion
- ▶ Predictions for risk-sharing patterns across cohorts
- ▶ Nice way to look at the predictions, given complexity: trace out the effects of the actual consumption-shock path
 - ▶ A drawback: Few (two) cohorts \Rightarrow discontinuities
 - ▶ Average over different possibility of ages at time 0
 - ▶ Krussel-Smith?
- ▶ One wish: Separate effects of TTID and heterogeneity

Results

	'This Time is Different'			Known mean
	<i>Data</i>	<i>EZ</i> : $\gamma = 10$	<i>Power</i> : $\gamma = 10$	<i>EZ</i> : $\gamma = 10$
	1929 – 2011	$\psi = 1.5, \beta = 0.994$	$\psi = 1/10, \beta = 0.994$	$\psi = 1.5, \beta = 0.994$
$E_T [r_m - r_f]$	5.1	5.2	0.1	1.5
$\sigma_T [r_m - r_f]$	20.2	16.6	10.5	12.9
$SR_T [r_m - r_f]$	0.25	0.31	0.01	0.12
$E_T [r_f]$	0.86	2.4	18.7	3.4
$\sigma_T [r_f]$	0.97	0.3	2.6	0.0
$\sigma_T [M_{t+1}] / E_T [M_{t+1}]$	-	0.51	0.20	0.27
$\gamma \times \sigma_T [\Delta c_{t+1}]$	-	0.27	0.27	0.27
$E_T [\Delta c_{t+1}]$	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%
$\sigma_T [\Delta c_{t+1}^{TA}]$	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%

Historical Path




Investment Economy


- ▶ Cobb-Douglas with (asymmetric) capital adjustment costs
- ▶ Mean TFP growth not known by agents
- ▶ Results presented for TTID (two-dynasty) economy
- ▶ Main observation:
 - ▶ TTID pushes equity volatility up to 6% (cf. Kaltenbrunner-Lochstoer)
 - ▶ Explanation: Aggressive updating of beliefs allows for higher adjustment costs, more variable q

Too Much Preference for Early Resolution of Uncertainty?

Experiment of Epstein et al (2014): What percentage of consumption would a Bansal-Yaron investor forego to have **all** consumption uncertainty resolved at time 1?



(a) Timing Premium constant volatility



(b) Risk Premium constant volatility

Some Final Comments

- ▶ “Pain”:
 - ▶ Do we really have to match AP moments?
 - ▶ How to judge whether increment in realism is worth that in complexity?
 - ▶ E.g., how many cohorts, what kind of learning, learning about what
- ▶ Objective:
 - ▶ Modus operandi: “best” parameters that match AP moments
 - ▶ How do we judge how good of a success $\gamma = 10$, $\psi = 1.5$ is?
 - ▶ Perhaps concentrate on satisfactory parameters and see how large AP effects. The model is bound to miss relevant channels anyway.
- ▶ Plausibility:
 - ▶ Young behave as more risk averse because they’re worried about learning something big and bad about their consumption trend
- ▶ Learning:
 - ▶ Are the findings of Malmendier and Nagel good descriptions of **representative** agent in a cohort?
 - ▶ Maybe interaction btw a rational agent and a TTID one would actually lead to similar results?

Conclusion

- ▶ Reasonable motivation; from the beginning a quantitative question
- ▶ Concern for calibrating to data where available
- ▶ Channel can certainly generate first-order effect
- ▶ Paper couched in terms of TTID, but heterogeneity likely to be important. Authors can help quantify and clarify this point.
- ▶ Production: tighten the message?
- ▶ Lots of stuff, great pedagogical value